Abstract. Camellia and MISTY1 are Feistel block ciphers. In this paper, we observe that, when conducting impossible differential cryptanalysis on Camellia and MISTY1, their round structures allow us to partially determine whether a candidate pair is right by guessing only a small fraction of the unknown required subkey bits of a relevant round at a time, instead of all of them. This reduces the computational complexity of an attack, and may allow us to break more rounds of a cipher. Taking advantage of this main observation, we significantly improve previous impossible differential cryptanalysis on reduced Camellia and MISTY1, obtaining the best published cryptanalytic results against both the ciphers.
Introduction
Camellia [1] is a 128-bit Feistel block cipher with a user key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits, while MISTY1 [18] is a 64-bit Feistel block cipher with a 128-bit user key. Both Camellia and MISTY1 were selected to be CRYPTREC [6] e-government recommended ciphers in 2002 and NESSIE [19] block cipher selections in 2003, and were adopted as ISO [9] international standards in 2005. Since Camellia and MISTY1 are increasingly being used in many real-life cryptographic applications, it is essential to continuing to investigate their security against different cryptanalytic attack scenarios. For simplicity, we denote the three versions of Camellia by Camellia-128/192/256, respectively.
Many cryptanalytic results on Camellia and MISTY1 have been published [2, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] . In summary, the best cryptanalytic results on Camellia without the FL functions are the truncated differential cryptanalysis [12] on 8-round Camellia-128 [15] , the impossible differential cryptanalysis on 12-round Camellia-192 [25] , and the linear [17] and impossible differential cryptanalysis on 12-round Camellia-256 [21, 25] ; the best cryptanalytic result on MISTY1 without the FL functions is the impossible differential cryptanalysis on 6-round MISTY1 [10] .
Impossible differential cryptanalysis [3, 13] , as a special case of differential cryptanalysis [5] , uses one or more differentials with a zero probability, called impossible differentials, which are usually built in a miss-in-the-middle manner [4] . In the impossible differential attacks on Camellia and MISTY1 described in [10, 25] , the general approach is to guess all the unknown required subkey bits of a relevant round to partially decrypt (or encrypt) a candidate pair through the round function; finally one checks whether the pair could produce the expected difference just before (resp. after) the round.
In this paper, however, we observe that, due to the round structures of Camellia and MISTY1, we can partially check whether a candidate pair could produce the expected difference by guessing only a small fraction of the unknown required round subkey bits at a time, and do a series of partial checks by guessing other fractions of the unknown required subkey bits, instead of guessing all the unknown required subkey bits at once. Since some wrong pairs can be discarded before the next guess for a different fraction of the required round subkey bits, we can reduce the computational workload for an attack, and even more importantly, we may break more rounds of a cipher. We call this the early abort technique 1 . Taking advantage of the early abort technique, we improve the previous impossible differential attacks on 12-round Camellia-192 without the FL functions and 6-round MISTY1 without the FL functions, and present impossible differential cryptanalysis of 11-round Camellia-128 without the FL functions and 13-round Camellia-256 without the FL functions, following [10, 25] . These are the best published cryptanalytic results on Camellia and MISTY1. Table 1 compares our new results with those previously known on Camellia and MISTY1, where "none" means that the relevant block cipher has no FL function, "all" means that it has all the FL functions, and "most" means that it has all the FL functions except the ones in the final swap layer.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe Camellia and MISTY1. In Section 3, we introduce the early abort technique in a general way. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our cryptanalytic results on Camellia and MISTY1, respectively. Section 6 summaries this paper.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we denote the bit-wise exclusive OR (XOR) operation by ⊕, and bit string concatenation by ||.
The Camellia Block Cipher
Camellia [1] takes a 128-bit plaintext P as input, and has a total of N rounds, where N is 18 for Camellia-128, and 24 for Camellia-192/256. Its encryption procedure is as follows. 
The MISTY1 Block Cipher
MISTY1 [18] takes a 64-bit plaintext P as input, and has a total of 8 rounds.
Its encryption procedure is as follows.
where KL, KI and KO are round subkeys, and the function FO takes as inputs a 32-bit block X and two 32-bit subkeys KO i and KI i , and outputs a 32-bit block Y , and is defined as follows (see [18] for details of the FL function).
In the above description, the FI function takes a 16-bit block X and a subkey KI ij as inputs, and outputs a 16-bit block Y , computed as defined below.
1. X = XL 0 (9 bits)||XR 0 (7 bits), KI ij = KI ijL (7 bits)||KI ijR (9 bits), 2.
where S 9 is a 9 × 9-bit bijective S-box, S 7 is a 7 × 7-bit bijective S-box, the function Extnd extends from 7 bits to 9 bits by concatenating two zeros on the left side, and the function Trunc truncates two bits from the left side.
A General Description of the Early Abort Technique
Impossible differential cryptanalysis is based on one or more impossible differentials, written α β, and it usually treats a block cipher E : {0,
n as a cascade of three sub-ciphers
, where E 0 denotes the rounds for which α β holds, E b denotes a few rounds before E 0 , and E a denotes a few rounds after E 0 . Given a guess for the subkeys used in E b and E a , if a plaintext pair produces a difference of α just after E b , and its corresponding ciphertext pair produces a difference of β just before E a , then this guess for the subkey must be incorrect. Thus, given a sufficient number of matching plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we can find the correct subkey by discarding the wrong guesses.
When checking if a plaintext pair produces a difference of α just after E b (or its corresponding ciphertext pair produces a difference of β just before E a ), the general approach is to guess all the unknown bits of the relevant round subkey necessary to partially encrypt (resp. decrypt) the pair through the substitution and diffusion layers; finally, one can check whether the pair could produce an expected difference just after (resp. before) the round. To make matters more specific, consider a general Feistel structure as in Camellia; as shown in Fig. 1 , we assume it has an nonlinear substitution consisting of m parallel S-boxes and a linear diffusion function P. For simplicity, we assume the round in Fig. 1 is just before E 0 ; that is to say, the attacker is looking for a pair with difference (∆L i+1 ||∆R i+1 ) = α. According to previous attack procedures, due to the diffusion of the P function, the attacker will guess all the required unknown subkey bits (i.e. those corresponding to the active S-boxes) at a time, then encrypt the left halves of the pair through the substitution layer to get the difference just after the P function, and finally XOR it with the difference ∆R i to check if it has the difference α after the round.
However, we observe that the round structure can allow us to partially determine whether a candidate pair could produce the expected difference α by guessing only a small fraction of the required round subkey bits at a time, instead of all of them simultaneously. More specifically, since we know the expected difference α and the intermediate values of the pair just before the round, we
can compute the expected difference just before the P function, denoted by
, as the P function is usually linearly invertible. Only if the expected difference ∆ appears after the substitution layer could the pair produce the difference α after the round. Thus, in the following, we guess only those of the required unknown subkey bits corresponding to one (or more) active S-box, then encrypt the pair through the S-box, and finally check if it produces the corresponding partial difference in ∆. If not, then the pair is not right, and we can discard it immediately; otherwise, we guess another part of the required round subkey bits corresponding to another active S-box, and check the pair similarly. A pair is right only if it could produce the partial difference out of the expected difference ∆ just before the P function, under every part of the required round subkey bits. Some wrong pairs can be discarded before the next guess; by this observation we can reduce the computational workload of an attack, and even more significantly, we may break more rounds.
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Camellia
As Camellia is byte-oriented, we represent the 128 bits before (or after) a round as 16 bytes, and denote the l-th byte of a subkey
Most recently, Wu et al. [25] presented an impossible differential cryptanalysis of 12-round Camellia-192/256 without the FL functions, which is based on the following 8-round impossible differentials: (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), where a and h are any two nonzero bytes. See Fig. 2 for for details of these 8-round impossible differentials.
In this section, we present an impossible differential cryptanalysis on 13-round Camellia-256, 12-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-128, following the work described in [25] . These are the best published cryptanalytic results on Camellia without the FL functions. 
Attacking 13-Round Camellia-256
We use the 8-round impossible differentials in Rounds 4 to 11. As every S-box has a minimal nonzero probability of 2 −7 , an output difference (h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) of the 8-round impossible differentials propagates to at most 2 7 possible output differences (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g, h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) after Round 12, where g is nonzero. Then, every (g, g, g, 0, g, 0, 0, g, h, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) propagates to at most (2 7 ) 5 possible output differences after Round 13. Hence, there are at most (2
5 ≈ 2 50 possible output differences after Round 13; we denote them by the set ∆ 13 .
We can use the early abort technique in the first two rounds and the last round of the 13-round attack. Consider a plaintext pair (
) with an output difference (∆L 13 , ∆R 13 ) belonging to ∆ 13 . The difference just after the S-box substitution layer of Round 13 must have the form (?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 0, 0, ?), where the question mark ? denotes an unknown byte difference (two bytes marked with ? may be different); and there must be a h such that 
The above analysis enables us to give the following procedure for attacking 13-round Camellia-256. Fig. 3 illustrates the attack.
Choose 2
8 structures: a structure is a set of 2 -Guess the byte k 13,l of the subkey K 13 ; -For every remaining pair (C i , C j ), partially decrypt the l-th byte of (R Step 4-(a), so it is expected that a proportion of about 1 − 2 −8 of the remaining pairs will be discarded after every iteration. -Guess the byte k 2,l of the subkey K 2 ; -For every remaining pair (P i , P j ), partially encrypt the l-th byte of (L memory accesses if conducted on a 32-bit computer; actually, it can be done more efficiently using computers of today.
For every remaining plaintext pair (P
Step 2 has a time complexity of about encryptions.
Step 5 has a time complexity of about
Step 6 has a time complexity
It is expected that Step 7 requires 2
24 · 2 128 = 2 152 trial encryptions to find the correct 256 key bits. Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of about 2 211.7 13-round Camellia-256 computations.
Attacking 12-Round Camellia-192
The impossible differential cryptanalysis of 12-round Camellia-192 due to Wu et al. [25] can be improved in the following several ways.
- Take 
Attacking 11-Round Camellia-128
To attack 11-round Camellia-128, we use the 8-round impossible differentials in Rounds 3 to 10, and use the early abort technique in the first round. The attack requires 2 120 chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of about 2
5 Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of 6-Round MISTY1 without FL Functions
In 2001, Kühn [10] presented an impossible differential cryptanalysis on 6-round MISTY1 (without the FL functions); the attack requires 2 39 plaintexts and has a time complexity of 2 106 6-round MISTY1 computations. Kühn also presented another impossible differential cryptanalysis on 6-round MISTY1, which requires more plaintexts but less computations. Both the attacks are based on the following generic 5-round impossible differentials for Feistel networks with bijective round structures: (0, 0, α l , α r ) (0, 0, α l , α r ), where (α l , α r ) = (0, 0). Kühn's attacks use a round structure equivalent to the original one, which is illustrated in Fig. 4 
The FO function MISTY1 has a modified Feistel structure, which is rather different from the "regular" one. Nevertheless, the MISTY1 round structure also allows us to use the early abort technique. As a result, we can improve the first attack due to Kühn, as follows. Fig. 4 ). As a consequence, using δ i,i we can compute the difference just after the S 7 S-box in the second FI by using AKO 62 . On the other hand, we know the two inputs to this S 7 S-box for the pair, whose difference is the right 7 bits of α r . Therefore, this attack has a total time complexity of about 2 85 6-round MISTY1 computations, significantly lower than the complexity of 2 106 for Kühn's attack.
Summary
In this paper, we observe that, when conducting an impossible differential cryptanalysis on Camellia and MISTY1, their round structures allow us to partially determine whether a candidate pair is right by guessing only a small fraction of the unknown required subkey bits of a relevant round at a time, instead of all of them. This can reduce the computation complexity of an attack, and may allow us to break more rounds. In light of the early abort technique, we improve the previous impossible differential attacks on 12-round Camellia-192 without the FL functions and 6-round MISTY1 without the FL functions, and present impossible differential cryptanalysis of 11-round Camellia-128 without the FL functions and 13-round Camellia-256 without the FL functions, obtaining the best published cryptanalytic results on Camellia and MISTY1.
